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NOTES AND COMMENTS
AVOIDANCE OF DouBLE INHERITANCE TAXATION OF INTANGIBLES BY
FEDERAL INTERPLEADER

One possible escape from the dilemma of an executor who finds
the intangible property of his estate subject to the transfer
inheritance tax of more than one state, each state claiming that the
decedent was domiciled within its borders when he died, is offered
in the decision of the Federal District Court of Massachusetts in
Worcester County Trust Company v. Long.'
The proceeding was brought by the Worcester Trust Company
as executor under the will of Robert H. Hunt against officials
of the states of California and Massachusetts, under the new
Federal Interpleader Act of 1936.2
Hunt had died on June 11, 1935, leaving real estate and bank
deposits in California and bank deposits in Massachusetts, as
well as considerable other intangible personal property. The com1 14 F. Supp. 754 (1936).
2 Pub. No. 422, approved Jan. 20, 1936, U.S.C.A., Title 28, sec. 41, subd.
(26). The Act confers on the Federal court original jurisdiction"(a) Of suits in equity begun by bills of interpleader or bills in the nature
of bills in interpleader duly verified, filed by any . . . corporation ...
having in . . . its custody or possession money or property of the value of
$500 or more, . . . or being under any obligation, written or unwritten,
to the amount of $500 or more, if"(i) Two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different states, are claiming to be entitled to such money or property, or to any one or more of the
benefits arising . . .by virtue of any such obligation; and
"(ii) The complainant (a) . . . (b) has given bond payable to the clerk
of the court in such amount and with such surety as the court or judge may
deem proper, conditioned upon the compliance by the complainant with the
future order or decree of the court with respect to the subject matter of the
controversy.
Such a suit in equity may be entertained although the titles or claims of the
conflicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical, but
are adverse to, and independent of, one another.
"(b) Such a suit may be brought in the district court of the district in
which one or more of such claimants resides or reside.
"(c) Notwithstanding any provision of Part I of this title to the contrary,
said court shall have power to issue its process for all such claimants and
to issue an order of injunction against each of them, enjoining them from
instituting or prosecuting any suit or proceeding in any State court or in
any United States court on account of such money or property or on such
instrument or obligation until the further order of the court; which process
and order of injunction shall be returnable at such time as the said court
or a judge thereof shall determine and shall be addressed to and served
by the United States marshals for the respective districts wherein said claimants reside or may be found.
"(d) Said court shall hear and determine the cause and shall discharge
the complainant from further liability; and shall make the injunction permanent and enter all such other orders and decrees as may be necessary or
convenient to carry out and enforce the same."
41
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plainant, alleging that officials of each state had asserted the
right to collect inheritance tax on the transfer of intangibles on
the theory that the decedent had died domiciled in the respective
state, prayed that the court require the respondents to plead their
adverse claims, that it determine the domicile of the decedent, and
that it enjoin the respondents of the non-domiciliary state permanently from taking any action to collect inheritance taxes from
the complainant based on domicile.
The California respondents contended that the proceeding was
one against states and thus prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. The court decided against this contention and sustained
the jurisdiction of the bill.
A brief reference to general principles of taxation law may be
pertinent. In order to have the power to levy such a tax, a state
must have jurisdiction of the property transferred; the test of
such jurisdiction has been determined to be whether or not the
situs of the property is within the state.3
Advancing from tangibles to intangibles, one has greater difficulty in applying the test of situs. The trouble arises, as suggested in Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in First National
Bank of Boston v. State of Maine,4 when one attempts to assign
a situs to that which is without situs. The general rule as given
by the majority opinion therein is that the situs of intangibles
is the domicile of the decedent. That case holds that one state only
can impose a transfer inheritance
tax on intangibles and that that
5
state is the state of domicile.
The struggle for jurisdiction over the taxable property does not
3 Frick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603,
69 L. Ed. 1058 (1925). See also, City Bank Farmers Trust Company v.
Schnader, 291 U. S. 24, 54 S. Ct. 259, 78 L. Ed. 628 (1934).
4284 U. S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174, 76 L. Ed. 313, 77 A.L.R. 1401 (1932).
5 For theories under which a non-domiciliary state claims tax jurisdiction
over intangibles passing by inheritance, see the following: Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Company v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 46 S. Ct. 256, 70 L. Ed.
475 (1926), involving stock of corporations organized within state, owned
by non resident decedent; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436,
74 L. Ed. 1056 (1930), involving Missouri tax on property of nonresident
decedent, consisting of deposits in Missouri banks, and U. S. bonds, promissory notes secured by mortgages on real estate in Missouri, and unsecured
promissory notes, all held in safe deposit box in Missouri; Farmers Loan and
Trust Company v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed. 371, 65
A.L.R. 1000 (1930), wherein Minnesota attempted to tax registered and
coupon bonds of Minnesota and cities thereof held in estate of nonresident
decedent, all of the securities being physically outside of the state; Beidler
v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. 1, 51 S. Ct. 54, 75 L. Ed. 131
(1930), where the fact that the debtor was domiciled within the state was
relied upon in an effort to tax the transfer of the debt to the next of kin of a
nonresident creditor.
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end, however, with the decision that the domiciliary state shall
prevail. The executor is faced, as here, with the possibility of
more than one state finding that the decedent was domiciled
within its limits, with the result that the decedent's estate is
subject to the demands of two or more taxing bodies, each claiming the exclusive right to the same tax. The fact that another
state has exacted a transfer inheritance tax does not defeat the
power of the state of domicile to impose such a tax.6 It is true
that, even for tax purposes, a man has but one domicile.7 Yet it
is competent for each state to find for itself that a decedent was
domiciled therein.
An example of the injustice that can result from this situation
is the double taxation of the Dorrance estate, in which, after
protracted litigation, the executors were finally compelled to pay
8
inheritance tax to two states upon the same property.
In the instant case the court was confronted with two principal
questions: one was whether a suit to enjoin tax officials from
6 Mann v. State Treasurer, 74 N. H. 345, 68 A. 130 (1907).
7 Rourke, Tax Collector v. Hanchette, 240 Mass. 557, 134 N. E. 355
(1922) ; Commonwealth v. Bogigian, 265 Mass. 531, 164 N. E. 472 (1929)
U. S. ex rel. Thomas v. Day, 29 F. (2d) 485 (1928).
8 The essential facts in the Dorrance case begin shortly after September
21, 1930, when Dr. John T. Dorrance died at his residence in New Jersey,
owning another residence in Pennsylvania. His will was probated in New
Jersey and on October 17, 1931, the State Tax Commissioner of New Jersey
assessed an inheritance tax on the property in that state. He included corporate stock owned by the decedent. About this time, appraisement for
Pennsylvania transfer inheritance tax purposes was made, which included
the aforementioned stock for taxation on the theory that the decedent was
domiciled in Pennsylvania at the time of his death. The Orphan's Court of
Delaware County, Pennsylvania, on petition of the executors, set aside the
appraisement on the ground that Dorrance was domiciled in New Jersey. On
appeal by the Pennsylvania tax authorities, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed the decision. Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932),
cert. den. 287 U. S. 660, 77 L. Ed. 570 (1932), and 288 U. S. 617, 77 L. Ed.
990 (1933).
Unsuccessful in Pennsylvania, the executors sought to have the New
Jersey assessment set aside as to the intangibles, claiming that such property
was taxable only in the state of domicile, and that since the Pennsylvania
court had determined domicile to be in that state, the New Jersey court
would have to give "full faith and credit" to that decision. The New Jersey
court, however, found that Dorrance was domiciled in New Jersey when he
died and that, hence, Pennsylvania did not have jurisdiction to determine
the question of domicile. In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N. J. Eq. 268, 170 A.
601 (1934), aff'd in Supreme Court of New Jersey in 13 N. J. Misc. Rep.
168, 176 A. 902 (1935), and in New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, 116
N. J. L. 362, 184 A. 743 (1936), cert. den. 80 L. Ed. 961, rehearing den. 80
L. Ed. 968 (1936).
Relief was refused in suit for injunction. Hill v. Martin and Dorrance v.
Martin, 12 F. Supp. 746 (1935), cert. den. 296 U. S. 957, 80 L. Ed. 270
(1935).
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collecting an illegal tax is a suit against a state; the other was
whether it is unconstitutional for two states to exact an inheritance tax on the same transfer where each bases its claim upon
a finding of domicile. For present purposes it is assumed that
the second question would be answered in the affirmative. The
balance of the discussion here deals only with the first question.
Was the court correct when it held that the executor was not
suing a state? Nominally, the parties to the suit were officials of
the state and not the state itself. Yet, actually, the benefit to flow
from the tax in question was for the state and not the officials,
who had no interest in the matter except in their official capacities. 9
For an answer, one must look to the theory of the state and
of representation of the state by its officers. Poindexter v.
Greenhow'0 states it succinctly: "The State itself is an ideal
person, intangible, invisible, immutable. The government is an
agent, and, within the sphere of the agency, a perfect representative; but outside of that, it is a lawless usurpation. The Constitution of the State is the limit of the authority of its government,
and both government and State are subject to the supremacy of
the Constitution of the United States, and of the laws made in
pursuance thereof. . . . It is also true, in respect to the State,
itself, that whatever wrong is attempted in its name is imputable
to its government, and not to the State, for, as it can speak and
act only by law, whatever it does say and do must be lawful."
How are these principles to be applied? In the Poindexter case,
the plaintiff had brought an action in detinue against the treasurer of the City of Richmond, Virginia, to recover a desk upon
9 Suits nominally against state officials but found to be against the State
as a sovereignty: Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. R. Co., 109 U. S.
446, 27 L. Ed. 992 (1883) ; Ex parte Ayers, 123 U. S. 443. 31 L. Ed. 216
(1887) ; Hagood v. Southern et al., 117 U. S. 52, 29 L. Ed. 805 (1886) ;
Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 43 L. Ed. 535 (1899). Suits against state
officials where jurisdiction was upheld: Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 21
L. Ed. 447 (1873) ; Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531, 23 L. Ed.
623 (1876) ; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 29 L. Ed. 185 (1885) ;
Pennoyer v. McConnaughty, 140 U. S. 1, 23 L. Ed. 623 (1876) ; Tindal v.
Wesley, 167 U. S. 204, 42 L. Ed. 137 (1897) ; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S.
466, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898); Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537, 47 L. Ed. 584
(1903) ; Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 50 L. Ed.
477 (1906) ; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908) ; Sterling
v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 77 L. Ed. 375 (1932) ; Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S. 18, 78 L. Ed. 145 (1933) ; Ex parte Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 37 L. Ed.
689 (1893) ; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 41 L. Ed. 632 (1897) ; Terrace
v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 68 L. Ed. 255 (1923) ; Cavanaugh v. Looney,
248 U. S. 453, 63 L. Ed. 354 (1919).
10 114 U. S. 270 (1885), at p. 290.
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which the defendant had levied for non-payment of taxes. The
defense of the Eleventh Amendment was found bad. The court
held that the defendant could justify only by producing a law
of the state authorizing his act. It was true that he could produce
a legislative act of the government of Virginia, but, since the act
violated the Federal Constitution, it was not a law of the State of
Virginia. In the words of the court, "The State has passed no
such law, for it cannot .... He stands, then, stripped of his official
character; and, confessing a personal violation of the plaintiff's
rights for which he must personally answer, he is without
defense. "
If it is objected that the distinction between the State and its
government constitutes too tenuous a refinement, it may be said
that the doctrine is enunciated in a portion of Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States."
"If the State of Ohio could have been made a party defendant,"
the opinion says, "it can scarcely be denied that this would be
a strong case for an injunction .... but if the person who is the
real principal, the person who is the true source of the mischief,
by whose power and for whose advantage it is done, be himself
above the law, be exempt from all judicial process, it would be
subversive of the best established principles to say that the laws
could not afford the same remedies against the agent employed in
doing the wrong which they would afford against him could his
principal be joined in the suit."
From an examination of the cases involving bills to enjoin
state officials from performing unconstitutional acts to the injury
of the parties suing, one finds ample authority for the Poindexter
case, without relying on the equitable principle pronounced by
Chief Justice Marshall. 12 That a suit against individuals for the
11 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204 (1824).

12 That a tortiously acting agent of a state must show that his authority
was sufficient in law to protect him, see Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115,
14 L. Ed. 75 (1851) ; Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204, 24 L. Ed. 471 (1877) ;
Meigs v. M'Clung's Lessee, 9 Cranch 11, 3 L. Ed. 639 (1815); Wilcox v.
Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 10 L. Ed. 264 (1839) ; Brown v. Huger, 21 How. 305,
16 L. Ed. 125 (1859); Grisar v. McDowell, 6 Wall. 363, 18 L. Ed. 863
(1868) ; U. S. v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 27 L. Ed. 171 (1882).
In addition to the cases cited by the court in Worcester County Trust
Co. v. Long on the right of officers of a state to be protected by the immunity
of a state from suit, see Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460, 21 L. Ed. 189

(1873) ; Litchfield v. Webster Co., 101 U. S. 773, 25 L. Ed. 925 (1880);
Allen v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 114 U. S. 311, 29 L. Ed. 200 (1885) ; Louisiana
v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 27 L. Ed. 448 (1883) ; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107
U. S. 769, 27 L. Ed. 468 (1883) ; Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles,
227 U. S. 278, 57 L. Ed. 510 (1913) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. Ed.
131 (1915).
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purpose of preventing them as officers of a state from enforcing
an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of the rights of the
plaintiff is not a suit against the State within the meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment was characterized as "settled doctrine" as
early as Smyth v. Ames. 13
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion is
that the executor was not suing the State, and that the court was
correct in denying the motion to dismiss. It would be premature,
at least, to predict the final outcome of the Worcester litigation
at this time, but a review of the record to date indicates that it
stands in accord with accepted principles on the issues raised.
It is probably generally conceded that the result, relieving the
estate of the burden of double transfer inheritance tax on
intangibles, is desirable, and there is reason to believe that the
method of reaching that result is sound.
H.

MACDONALD

STATUTORY REGULATION OF WAGE ASSIGNMENTS IN ILLINOIS

On July 1, 1935, the Illinois legislature approved an act' to
regulate the assignment of wages. This is the first attempt to
dictate wage assignment law since 1905 when the legislature
passed an act 2 providing that no assignment of wages or salary
should be valid unless the following provisions were complied
with: (1) the assignment was to be in writing, signed by the
assignor; (2) it was to be ackowledged in person by the assignor
before a justice of peace of the township in which the assignor
resided and entered upon his docket; (3) a copy of the assignment and acknowledgment was to be served on the employer
three days from the date of execution; (4) if the assignor was
married, the husband or wife was to join in both the execution
and the acknowledgment, and further provided that the assignment should be absolutely void when given to secure the payment
of a usurious loan, or when the wages or salary assigned were to
be earned more than six months after the making of the assignment. While no prophecy is intended here, it is believed that a
comparison of the two acts might be advantageous.
The constitutionality of the 1905 act was attacked on the
13 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898).

1 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 48, par. 39.1-39.9. With the
passage of this act, Illinois joined 39 other states that have, by some legislation, attempted to regulate the use of the wage assignment by statute.
C. C. H. Labor Law Service, paragraphs 4901-4949.
2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1908), p. 176.
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ground that it was a prohibition upon the wage-earner's right to
contract, and hence a violation of the due process clause of the
State Constitution,8 in Massie v. Cessna,4 where the plaintiff
raised the question of constitutionality to meet the statutory
defense to an action on a wage assignment given to secure a loan
tainted with usury. The defendant contended that such an act
was within the scope of the police power of the state by reason of
the inherent evils among wage-earners of small loan usury.
The court held for the plaintiff and found the statute unconstitutional. It followed previous decisions 5 in declaring that "the
right to labor for and to render services to another, and the right
to dispose of the compensation to be received for so doing are
property rights," and held that such property rights are within
the restriction of the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution and that the statute was at least an abridgment of the right
of the man who earns wages and the right of a man who earns a
salary to contract with reference thereto. The decision suggested,
by way of dictum, that the elimination of the word "salary"
might bring the act under the police power of the state, but that
the term "wages and salaries" was too broad to merit the protection of such power. Although the evils of usury among wageearners were readily admitted, the court pointed out that no protection was needed by the president of a corporation. Further,
the act was held to be class legislation since it made wage assignments tainted with usury void, while the State law makes no such
provision with reference to other instruments or conveyances
given to secure usurious debts. In conclusion, the court commented on the fact that the act was impractical in that residents
of the city of Chicago could not comply with the provision for
acknowledgment before a justice of peace since such officials had
been abolished in that district. It may be noted that this Illinois
decision stands without a parallel or precedent in any other
state.6
In view of this action on the 1905 act and of the attitude of
the Illinois Supreme Court both on the nature of earned wages
as a property interest and on the extension of the police power
to regulate wage and salary assignments, speculation concerning
3 Article II, sec. 2.
239 Ill. 352, 88 N. E. 152 (1909).
Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. 395 (1892); Mallin v. Wenham,
209 Ill. 252, 70 N. E. 564 (1904).
6 Guy M. Blake, The Validity of Laws Regulating Wage Assignments,
5 Ill. L. Rev. 343 (1911); comment by H. C. Havighurst, 26 Ill. L. Rev.
4
5

800 (1932).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

the probable attitude of the court toward the new, act may well
be made. Before one draws conclusions, however, a comparison
of the two acts should be made in relation to the decision in
Massie v. Cessna. Seven 7 of the nine subdivisions of the act of
1935 have no bearing on the subject under discussion, although
it may be of interest to note that the provisions of one8 of the
seven sections provides that the demand under a wage assignment, to have legal effect, shall not be served on the employer
unless: (1) there has been a default which is continuing at the
time of the demand; (2) a correct statement of the amount of
the'default, and the original, or a photostatic copy thereof, of
the assignment is exhibited to the employer.
The two remaining sections constitute that part of the act
with which this comment is most concerned. They read as follows:
"39.1. § 1. No assignment of wages earned or to be earned
shall be valid unless
"(1) In writing signed by the wage-earner, in person, and
bearing the date of its execution, the name of the employer of
the wage-earner at the time of its execution, the amount of the
money loaned or the price of the articles sold or other consideration given, the rate of interest, if any, to be paid, and the date
when such payments are due;
"(2) Given to secure an existing debt of the wage-earner or
one contracted by the wage-earner simultaneous with its execution;
"(3) An exact copy thereof be furnished to the wage-earner at
the time the assignment is executed;
"(4) Headed by the words 'Wage Assignment,' to be printed
or written in bold face letters of not less than one-quarter inch
in height.
"39.4. § 4. No more than twenty-five per centum of the wages
of a wage earner shall be subject to collection by the assignee. If
there is more than one assignment demand received by the
employer, the assignees shall collect in the order of priority of
service of the demand upon the employer but the total of all
collections shall not exceed twenty-five per centum of the wages
of the wage-earner covering any period."
If it is a fact that wages earned are a "property right," then
the first reaction to section 4, limiting the amount to be collected
to 25 per cent, is that this is an abridgment of the right to con7 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 48, pars. 39.2, 39.3, 39.5, 39.6,
39.7, 39.8, 39.9.

8 Par. 39.2.
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tract in relation to such property right. However, this may not
constitute such an abridgment as would void the statute. Section 4 may be considered in conjunction with a section of the
Small Loans Act, 9 since repealed, which limited assignments to
secure loans made by licensed lenders to 50 per cent of the employee's earnings. This latter act was upheld by the Illinois
Supreme Court.' 0 In view of that decision, the only doubt cast
upon the validity of this provision of the present act is whether
or not the maximum of a 25 per cent collection is a reasonable
restriction.
The criticism of class legislation does not apply to the present
act, since the legislature did not attempt to void a certain class
of contract as it did with the wage assignments given to secure
usurious loans in the 1905 act. Regarding the Massie v. Cessna
decision, the most important change is that the present act does
not include employees drawing a salary. As explained, the court
felt, when it held the 1905 act was unconstitutional, that the
inclusion of salary-earners in the act was the main bar to the
invocation of the police power of the state. Any court that admits
the necessity of protecting the wage-earner in relation to his
assignments of his future wages is certainly taking the first step
in holding the present act constitutional by reason of such police
power. The usual argument against the use of the police power
for such protection and to.establish the invalidity of acts of this
nature is that where it can be seen from the provisions of a statute involving the question that it has no tendency to promote the
public health, safety, morals, comfort, or welfare, the courts
are authorized to declare such statute invalid. However, that the
police power of the state may be extended to the protection of
earnings is well illustrated in Illinois by the act providing for
special exemption in relation to garnishments.'1
Aside from the question of the propriety of the exercise of the
police power to exempt 75 per cent of wages from collection,
however, another provision of the new act may furnish ground
for speculation. By section 1 it is provided that '"no assignment
of wages earned or to be earned shall be valid unless . . . given
to secure an existing debt of the wage-earner or one contracted by
the wage-earner simultaneous with its execution." It will be noted
that this would restrict the right to alienate not merely wages
9 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1929), Ch. 74, par. 16.
159, 118 N. E. 91 (1917), distinguishing Massie
10 People v. Stokes, 281 Ill.
v. Cessna, supra, footnote 4.
11 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 62, par. 14.
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to be earned but also those already earned. If wages earned are
a property right-and that seems to be established in Illinoisl 'this section would restrict the use of property for contracting
future debts or for gifts. While the police power might well be
extended to prevent the waiver of a future right, it is doubtful
whether a man should be prevented from giving or contracting
away a present right of property.'"
Furthermore, it may be suggested that since the restriction of
the act applies unless the assignment is given to secure a debt,
an assignment of wages already earned could not be given as a
present payment for value received, since in that case no debt
could exist. The existence of a debt presupposes a unilateral contract, whereas if the wages were assigned as payment, the contract would have been fully executed by both parties.
While these considerations must necessarily be limited to speculation, it behooves employers, especially, to act with caution
until the Supreme Court of the state has passed upon them.
G. 0. HEBFm
READER'S COMMENT

I have read with interest and profit the very well written
article by Mr. Joseph Boueek appearing in the September, 1936,
issue of your REVIEW, and feel that the article will help to
illuminate a subject which, because of our use of tract books and
abstracts of title in making examinations of titles, has caused
us to overlook the fact that the chain of title does not consist -f
all of the instruments appearing in an abstract of title but only
those which are entitled to be recorded and which by reason of
their sequence in connection with preceding transfers form a
part of the continuous flow of title from grantor to grantee.
I note one statement, however, which appears to me to be
incomplete. At the end of the first paragraph on page 308 the
statement is made: "A person is within a chain of title from the
date a deed to him as grantee is recorded. His deeds made as
grantor and recorded prior to that date are not within the chain
12

State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 345 Ill. 160, 177 N. E. 702

(1931).

13 "The owner may, if he chooses, sell, or otherwise dispose of any property he may have, however much his family may need it, but the law will not
aid him in that regard, nor permit him to contract, in advance, [that] his

creditor may use the process of the courts to deprive his family of its benefit
and use, when an exemption has been created in their favor. Laws enacted
from consideration of public concern, and to subserve the general welfare,
cannot be abrogated by mere private agreement." Recht v. Kelly, 82 Ill. 147
(1876).
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and therefore do not afford constructive notice." This statement
is apt to prove misleading. It is true that as between two
grantees from a common grantor, he who first records his deed
(omitting consideration of good faith or actual notice) acquires
the better title, but when that deed is recorded, the link which it
comprises in the chain of title dates back to the date of the deed
and not merely to the date of record thereof. Therefore, if A acquires title by deed dated July 15, 1936, and records it on September 24, 1936, his deed has no existence until it appears on the
record so far as purchasers from his grantor are concerned.
However, after A's deed has been recorded, conveyances by A
dated on or after July 15, 1936, are within the chain, and are
notice under the recording laws, whether those conveyances are
recorded prior or subsequent to the recording of the deed to A.
But conveyances by A recorded prior to July 15, 1936, would not
be within the chain of title even after the recording of the conveyance to A. This point might become important in considering
mortgages made by A which may be recorded prior to the date
of his deed. Such a mortgage, if it is recorded prior to the date
of the deed to A, would not be within the chain of title, and the
record thereof would not be notice to purchasers or creditors
under the recording statute. Yet such a mortgage, even though
dated prior to July 15, 1936, if recorded between the latter date
and September 24, 1936, would be within the chain.
WALTER B. SMITH

